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Abstract 
In the literature there’s an established consensus on the strong and significant correlation between 
the stock of immigrants in the receiving country and the amount of trade with their country of 
origin. Surprisingly, only a few studies emphasize the role of ethnic minorities in triggering trade 
between various regions in the world. Rauch and Trindade (2002) was the first contribution to study 
those indirect links between Chinese in different host countries finding a large effect of those 
networks on trade. Following a similar approach, this paper studies the pro-trade effect of Indian 
ethnic minorities in 19 OECD countries. In particular, we investigate how the pro-trade effect of 
these networks varies with the quality of traded products over the period 1995-2005. Our findings 
show that the effect of Indian Networks is much larger than the correspondent impact of Chinese 
minorities. Furthermore, both these indirect effects seem to dominate the direct impact of the ethnic 
links between source and host countries: this result suggests that the pro-trade role of migrants in the 
OECD context is largely determined by the major ethnic minorities. Lastly, the indirect pro-trade 
effect of Indian networks is particularly strong for products of low and low-medium quality. We 
conjecture that this result is likely to be driven by specific information advantages of Indian Ethnic 
Networks over low-price commodities which follow the specialization on the low quality segment 
of their country of origin. 
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1. Introduction 
Most international migrants, around 70 per cent of the over 230 million foreign born in 2013 are born 
in the South (UN 2013). The majority are from Asia, which – according to UN – recently became the 
largest diaspora group. In 1990, international migrants born in Asia were around 21 million. By 2010, 
they almost doubled (+76.2%) reaching 37 million. Furthermore, Asian countries have been sending a 
large number of highly-skilled professionals and tertiary level students, predominantly to OECD 
countries. In this regard, UN-OECD (2013) report that more than 2 million tertiary educated migrants 
originating from this region arrived in the OECD countries in the period between 2008 and 2013. In 
particular, India has been recently characterized by sending high skilled, educated international 
migrants: according to UN-OECD (2013) around 2 million of Indian-born tertiary educated 
immigrants were living in OECD countries in 2010/11. 
Migration, especially of skilled, has triggered controversial views. Some highlight the “brain drain” 
risk, other see it as an opportunity to enhance links, trade, FDI while at the same time increasing 
domestic skills and education levels. More precisely, a number of concerns point to the loss for 
sending countries of the positive externalities of high skilled workers. As first noted by Ratha et al. 
(2011) highly educated workers generate positive externalities that are crucial to economic growth and 
development. These externalities – such as (i) productivity spillovers to both high and low-skilled 
workers, (ii) public services such as healthcare and education that have both immediate and future 
social spillovers, (iii) innovative and creative activities that are at the core of long-term growth, and 
(iv) contributions to the health of social, political, and economic institutions – are lost for high skilled 
migrants’ home countries upon their departure (the “brain drain”). 
Against this background, the diaspora – if properly managed – can contribute to the social and 
economic development of the sending countries. Ratha et al. (2011) argue that migration – especially 
of the highly skilled – generates numerous and important benefits for the home countries as well. 
Migrants send remittances to their families and enforce economic and social linkages between their 
native lands and the rest of the world. Furthermore, among other positive diaspora externalities are the 
return of professionals with enhanced skills, a positive impact on the demand for education in the 
sending country and the facilitation of Cross-Border Trade, Technology Transfer and Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) (see Ratha et al. 2011). Among these positive externalities, the link between ethnic 
networks and bilateral trade/FDI has been the object of many recent studies. A strand of trade 
literature (see for instance Gould 1994 and Javorcik et al. 2011) has documented a positive association 
between the presence of ethnic networks and international trade & FDI, normally estimated through a 
gravity equation. The underlying idea is that international transactions are negatively affected by 
informal trade barriers, other than formal hurdles such as transportation costs and tariffs. Among the 
main informal barriers to international transactions are the information costs, such as the difficulties 
associated with provision of information on many aspects, including sales channels, product 
characteristics, potential market opportunities, and with enforcing contracts across national 
boundaries. As pointed out by Javorcik et al. (2011: 231) “the presence of people with the same ethnic 
or national background on both sides of a border may alleviate these problems”. 
The relationship between trade and migration flows is likely to be biunivocal: in a perfectly 
competitive world, trade and migration are substitutes, while they are complement in an imperfect 
setting and the direction of causation is far from clear. More specifically, international migrants could 
enhance bilateral trade by lowering information costs and increasing demand for goods from their 
source countries. The existing literature assumes that both imports and exports are symmetrically 
affected by improved information while only import from source countries depend on migrants’ 
preferences. Empirically this bi-univocal relationship and the uncertainty of the expected sign due to 
the complementary/substitutes relationship triggered contrasting results and lack of consensus. 
However, high skilled migrants tend to impact more on trade because of lower liquidity constraints 
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and advantages in their human capital that imply lower costs. Hence, there seems to be some 
agreement on the fact that high-skilled migrants have a high pro-trade effect (see Herander and 
Saavedra 2005; Felbermayr and Jung 2009; Felbermayr and Toubal 2012). 
In this context, while most of the literature focuses on the trade-enhancing role of direct ethnic links 
between source and host countries, only a few contributions study the indirect links of ethnic minorities 
that are seen “as middlemen who are active as cosmopolitan catalysts for economic transactions between 
global cities such as New York, London, or Singapore that form the backbone of the world economy” 
(Felbermayr, Jung, and Toubal 2010: 41). The seminal contribution which studies those indirect links 
between agents of the same ethnicity in different host countries is Rauch and Trindade (2002) who focus 
on Chinese minorities. They found a large indirect pro-trade effect of Chinese Ethnic Networks in 
comparison with other trade determinants, an impact which becomes stronger for differentiated goods. 
We decided to focus on India, whose recent emigration flows to OECD consist predominantly of skilled 
migrants and university students and – according to UN data – has recently become the top origin 
countries for the number of international migrants with 14.2 million. 
We test empirically for the period 1995-2005 whether migration triggers trade and if/to what extent 
the relationship between migrants and trade varies with product quality and migrants skills. More 
precisely, we investigate how the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks varies with the quality of traded 
products. By building on Fontagné, Gaulier and Zignago (2008), we exploit the characteristics of 
BACI/CEPII dataset and divide the spectrum of traded goods into vertically differentiated varieties 
based on Export Unit Values (EUV) rather than sectors. To our knowledge the link between product 
quality and the pro-trade elasticity of ethnic networks has not yet been explored in the literature. 
Existing studies mainly focused on the variation of the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks due to 
different levels of goods’ heterogeneity, following the methodology adopted by Rauch and Trindade 
(2002). We extend their work by classifying traded goods according to their quality level and we 
separately estimate pro-trade elasticity of high-skilled networks for each subgroup. 
Our empirical analysis first compare the indirect pro-trade effect of Indian networks with the 
correspondent effect for Chinese minorities. We find that in a selected sample of 19 OECD receiving 
economies Indian networks exert a pro-trade effect which is twice as big: this finding is in line with 
the conclusions of Felbermayr et al. (2010) whose results reveal that the trade creating potential of 
Chinese network is dwarfed by other networks. Furthermore, our statistics indicate that the indirect 
pro-trade effect of the networks formed by Indian and Chinese ethnic minorities dominates the 
correspondent direct effect between source and host OECD countries. We believe this result is 
striking: the pro-trade role of migrants in the OECD context seems to be driven mostly by the major 
ethnic minorities. As it emerges from the evidence, this effect is particularly strong for products of low 
and low-medium quality. We conjecture that this result may reflect the comparative advantage of their 
country of origin: since India is specialized in the production of varieties of low-medium quality, 
Indian networks – through their role in the matching of trading opportunities and provision of market 
and product information – tend to mostly facilitate trade of those varieties. Lastly, the high-skill Indian 
networks have a much greater impact on trade than low skilled migrants. This is consistent across 
quality levels and the same trend over quality applies: as for the total stock, the largest impact of the 
high skill is still on medium-low quality commodities. These findings have a number of policy 
implications that can be usefully used in the hot debate on migration. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the “Indian Diaspora” and presents some 
descriptive statistics on the size of Indian Minorities by destination country and skill level along with 
its evolution over time, while Section 3 provides some evidence on India’s trade specialization on the 
low market segment along with a larger import demand for low quality varieties. Section 4 reviews the 
literature on the pro-trade effect of migrants and summarizes the main stylized facts. Section 5 
describes the data used in the analysis, the empirical methodology implemented and the econometric 
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specification. Section 6 outlines the results and Section 7 summarizes the main findings and suggests 
some policy conclusions. 
2. A Short Description of the Indian “New Diaspora” 
The Indian Diaspora is estimated to be the second largest in the world and has a diversified global 
presence. The Diaspora estimated at over 25-30 million, represents around 1% of Indian population 
and it is spread across more than 200 countries. The history of migration from India dates back at least 
two thousand years. However, the destinations of Indian Diaspora have been varying over time: in the 
“Old Diaspora” – which is a pre-WW2 phenomenon and constitutes nowadays around 60% of the 
whole population of Indian Origin residing abroad – the most attractive destinations were Malaysia, 
Sri Lanka, Burma, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Fiji, Guyana, and Suriname.
1
 
The “New Diaspora”, on the other hand, consists of migrants who left India in large numbers from 
the mid-1960s onwards primarily to OECD countries like United Kingdom, United States, Canada, 
Australia, and Western Europe. The “New Diaspora” became particularly prominent in the 1960s when 
some developed countries introduced new immigration legislations. In United States, for instance the 
Hart-Celler Act abolished national-origins quotas, and made it possible for high-skilled immigrants, 
including Indians, to gain legal, permanent residence in the United States. Similar initiatives occurred in 
Canada (1968) and UK (in the period 1947-1962 and from mid 80s) where Indian immigration picked up 
considerably.
2 Lastly, other than OECD destinations, the 1970s oil boom in the Middle East triggered 
significant migration – predominantly middle and low skilled – from India towards the Gulf area. Table 
1 illustrates the wave of both the “New” and “Gulf”  Indian Diasporas over the years since 1970: it 
reports the total number of Indian emigrants along with the top 9 destinations for Indian emigrants in 
2000 (Özden et al. 2011). The total number of Indian emigrants refer to the global stock of 
international migrants born in India and residing in 232 countries in the world.
3
  
Table 1. The size of Indians’ Diaspora (in millions), top Destination Countriesa 
Destination Country year 1970 year 1980 year 1990 year 2000 
Pakistan 4.86 3.90 3.13 2.51 
Nepal 0.32 0.23 0.41 0.56 
United States 0.07 0.23 0.49 1.04 
United Kingdom 0.34 0.40 0.43 0.52 
Saudi Arabia 0.07 0.36 0.93 1.01 
Canada 0.04 0.08 0.15 0.31 
Bangladesh 0.70 0.78 0.85 0.94 
Sri Lanka 1.08 0.64 0.45 0.38 
United Arab Emirates 0.02 0.23 0.44 0.75 
TOTAL 8.26 7.58 8.18 9.52 
a The figures refer to the total stock of migrants (in millions) born in India and resident in the reported countries.  
Source: Özden et al. (2011). 
Some of the top-destinations – Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and Pakistan – are neighboring 
countries; the others – Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia and United Arab 
                                                     
1
 Sources: The Fair Observer, February, “The Indian Diaspora: Past, Present and Future” and The Ministry of 
Overseas Indian Affairs. 
2
 Source: The Fair Observer, February 2013, “The Indian Diaspora: Past, Present and Future”. 
3
 Table 10 in Appendix shows in detail the evolution of the stocks of Indian emigrants in each of these countries. 
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Emirates – are OECD and Gulf economies that are among the most attractive destinations for 
international migrants according to UN (2013). Many of them figure among the top destinations in 
1970 as well, but their shares over total numbers of Indian emigrants increased dramatically over the 
years meaning that Indian migration flows have become more and more concentrated into a restricted 
number of countries. 
Figure 1. Share of Total Indian Emigrants in the 19-OECD Destination Countries: 1960 vs 2000
a
 
a
 The graphs refer to the comparison of the share of the total Indian emigrants in our sample of 19 OECD 
countries between 1960 and 2000. The percentages are rounded to the first decimal. The graph in the left hand 
side refers to 1960 whereas the right hand side is for 2000. 
Source: our elaboration from Özden et al. (2011) data. 
Figure 1 illustrates the change in the share of total Indian emigrants resident in our selected 19-
countries OECD sample between 1960 and 2000. United Kingdom and United States went from 
hosting 2.1% and 0.1% of the total number of Indians resident in countries other than India in 1960, to 
6% and 11% in 2000, respectively. Interestingly, the largest share of the composition of the “New 
Diaspora” towards OECD economies has been of Indians High Skilled as documented in the literature. 
Docquier and Rapoport (2012) argue that the presence of highly educated Indians among the business, 
scientific, and academic elites of the United Kingdom, the United States, and other Western countries 
is impressive. Indeed, Indians represent the bulk of H1-B visas holders in the United States, a visa 
category aimed at skilled professionals in sectors with occupational shortages. In this regard, 
Kirkegaard (2015) investigates US-India labor migration and finds that Indian nationals account for 
about half of all US employment-based permanent migration (e.g. green cards) in recent years and they 
also make up half or more of the entrants on the two main high-skilled temporary US visa categories. 
Further evidence indicates that Indian Emigrants are concentrated predominantly in large cities that 
are the backbone of the world economy. Rienzo and Silva (2014) show that India is the most common 
country of birth among the foreign-born in the United Kingdom in 2013: more importantly, Indian 
Migrants stand for the biggest group among the foreign-born population in London (8.6%), the region 
where the share of foreign-born people relative to total population was greatest. In addition to the 
above, India has also been sending the largest number of internationally mobile students after China. As 
documented in Mukherjee and Chanda (2012) student flows from India have increased substantially 
since 2000 and grew by over 256 percent (from 53,266 to 190,781) between 2000 and 2009. In 2009, 
Indian students constituted 6.2 percent of all international students whose top destinations are United 
States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and Russia. 
Table 2 provides some evidence in support of the predominance of the high skill emigrants in the 
“New Diaspora” composition. The table reports the evolution in the number of Indian Emigrants and 
the correspondent share on total population over time in our sample of 19 OECD countries. Data are 
from Brucker, Capuano, and Marfouk (2013). We separate the total stock from the high-skilled for the 
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years 1995, 2000, 2005 and 2010. The statistics indicate that since 1995 more than 50% of Indian 
emigrants in our sample are high skilled; this share has also progressively increased over time, going 
from just above 50% in 1995 to almost 70% in 2010. Lastly, by looking at the cross-country 
differences in the more recent period 2005-2010, the largest Indian communities are in US, Canada, 
Great Britain, New Zealand and UK where more than half of those Indian residents are high skilled, 
with the only exception of Great Britain. 
Table 2. Indian Emigrants in Selected OECD Economies
ab
 
Iso3-Code year total high share total share high year total high share total share high 
AUS 1995 62475 43241 0.35% 0.24% 2000 77428 55514 0.40% 0.29% 
AUT 1995 4952 747 0.06% 0.01% 2000 6418 879 0.08% 0.01% 
CAN 1995 206635 95185 0.70% 0.32% 2000 276835 134755 0.90% 0.44% 
CHE 1995 5286 2226 0.08% 0.03% 2000 5680 2901 0.08% 0.04% 
CHL 1995 2102 410 0.01% 0.00% 2000 2718 555 0.02% 0.00% 
DEU 1995 26502 3377 0.03% 0.00% 2000 27345 4543 0.03% 0.01% 
DNK 1995 1793 468 0.03% 0.01% 2000 2259 644 0.04% 0.01% 
ESP 1995 4077 867 0.01% 0.00% 2000 6418 962 0.02% 0.00% 
FIN 1995 513 90 0.01% 0.00% 2000 852 124 0.02% 0.00% 
FRA 1995 11005 2347 0.02% 0.00% 2000 14327 3406 0.02% 0.01% 
GBR 1995 403148 104618 0.69% 0.18% 2000 395955 125736 0.66% 0.21% 
GRC 1995 2135 406 0.02% 0.00% 2000 4220 240 0.04% 0.00% 
IRL 1995 1268 838 0.04% 0.02% 2000 2005 1383 0.05% 0.04% 
NDL 1995 5644 974 0.04% 0.01% 2000 7047 1715 0.04% 0.01% 
NOR 1995 3272 879 0.08% 0.02% 2000 3776 1396 0.08% 0.03% 
NZL 1995 10518 4191 0.29% 0.11% 2000 16011 6951 0.42% 0.18% 
PRT 1995 6651 1306 0.07% 0.01% 2000 6210 1280 0.06% 0.01% 
SWE 1995 3908 1361 0.04% 0.02% 2000 5560 2053 0.06% 0.02% 
USA 1995 475933 364484 0.18% 0.14% 2000 689703 537870 0.24% 0.19% 
∑N 
n=1 migni 
  
 1237924c 628035    1550995c 882987   
  (50.7%)     (56.9%)   
AUS 2005 88195 65901 0.43% 0.32% 2010 99488 77458 0.48% 0.38% 
AUT 2005 7212 1427 0.09% 0.02% 2010 7704 1437 0.09% 0.02% 
CAN 2005 390080 220180 1.21% 0.68% 2010 465098 303416 1.43% 0.93% 
CHE 2005 5941 2957 0.08% 0.04% 2010 6307 3163 0.08% 0.04% 
CHL 2005 3565 787 0.02% 0.00% 2010 4944 1210 0.03% 0.01% 
DEU 2005 31682 7389 0.04% 0.01% 2010 37062 11666 0.04% 0.01% 
DNK 2005 3123 891 0.06% 0.02% 2010 5347 1217 0.10% 0.02% 
ESP 2005 18133 4405 0.04% 0.01% 2010 28976 7335 0.07% 0.02% 
FIN 2005 1679 212 0.03% 0.00% 2010 3234 606 0.06% 0.01% 
FRA 2005 14227 4091 0.02% 0.01% 2010 25988 7116 0.04% 0.01% 
GBR 2005 445405 169173 0.74% 0.28% 2010 547395 249502 0.91% 0.41% 
GRC 2005 5272 483 0.05% 0.00% 2010 5705 579 0.05% 0.01% 
IRL 2005 4829 3761 0.12% 0.09% 2010 7657 6352 0.18% 0.15% 
NDL 2005 8837 2109 0.05% 0.01% 2010 13940 3558 0.09% 0.02% 
NOR 2005 4564 1494 0.10% 0.03% 2010 6911 2532 0.15% 0.05% 
NZL 2005 32010 19410 0.78% 0.47% 2010 33360 18334 0.81% 0.44% 
PRT 2005 7624 1724 0.07% 0.02% 2010 9212 2062 0.09% 0.02% 
SWE 2005 8807 3707 0.10% 0.04% 2010 13551 6430 0.15% 0.07% 
USA 2005 1224806 996308 0.41% 0.34% 2010 1457640 1195820 0.49% 0.40% 
∑N 
n=1 migni 
  
 2306234c 1506498    2779780c 1899893   
  (65.3%)     (68.3%)   
a Data are from IAB brain drain database by Brucker et al. (2013). 
b total and high are the total and high skilled stocks of Indian Emigrants resident in each of the country of the selected OECD sample, 
respectively. share total and share high are the shares of total and high skilled stocks over populations of countries of destination. 
c It is the sum of emigrants from India (i) resident in all countries (n) of our OECD sample. In brackets is the share of high skill over the 
total population of Indian Emigrants.  
Source: data on populations are from CEPII. The calculations of these shares are our own. 
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3. India’s Foreign Trade and Comparative Advantage 
Back in the 1950s, India, like many other developing countries, including China, chose to follow an 
import substitution strategy, which involved insulation from the world. Later, during the 1980s, 
India’s liberalization initiatives focused more on internal deregulation than on trade liberalization. 
Only in the 1990s, in response to a severe balance of payment crisis, things started to change in favor 
of a reduction in trade barriers. However, despite this substantial episode of unilateral trade 
liberalization, while China’s share in the world exports steadily increased from less than 1% (in 1980) 
to more than 6% (2004) and over 10% (since 2009), India’s exports have been increasing less since the 
early-1990s – both as a share of GDP and as a share of world exports. More precisely, Indian exports 
as a share of world goods exports almost tripled to 1.7 percent during 1995-2013, while India’s 
services export more than tripled to over 3 percent of world service exports in a much shorter period, 
2000-2013 (see Anand, Kalpana, and Mishra 2015). In this regard, as noted by Anand et al. (2015), 
the peculiarity of Indian foreign trade compared to other emerging economies is the large and growing 
share of services exports, especially modern services. More precisely, Indian services exports, as a 
share of total exports and in terms of sophistication, are comparable to high income countries.  
As for the manufacturing sector, the evolution of Indian exports indicate an increasing share of 
manufacturing exports still dominated by relatively low-technology content.
4 Indeed, the quality, 
sophistication and complexity of Indian exported manufacturing products remain below the level of 
other emerging economies, which seems to denote a comparative advantage in unskilled labor-intensive 
goods. In support of this statement, the next two sections provide some evidence on the sector 
composition of India’s exports as well as the specialization of Indians’ exports on the low segment of 
the quality spectrum. 
3.1 Sector Analysis 
Table 3 reports the ten leading HS-2 sectors for India’s exports in 1995, 2000 and 2005. The data are 
from BACI/CEPII dataset and each leading sector is reported along with its share on total exports 
and the correspondent HS product category. Exports are driven predominantly by labor and resource 
intensive manufactures. In 1995 and 2000 Cotton and Articles of Apparel are the leading exporting 
sectors: the two industries combined stand for 18.1% and 16.1% of total Indian exports, respectively. 
Furthermore, only five sectors figure regularly each year in the top-ten ranking, indicating an 
important change in the composition of Indian Exports over time. Indeed, in 2005 the textile sectors 
drop their share in total exports in favor of mineral-and-natural resource intensive manufacturing 
sectors such as Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. and Mineral fuels, oils, distillation 
products, etc. 
Although the ranking reported in Table 3 is indicative of the sector composition of India’s exports, it 
doesn’t say much regarding India’s specialization relative to other economies nor about the market 
positioning of Indian exports in international trade. In order to assess the comparative advantages of 
India we first report the indexes of Balassa Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) at HS-2 sector. 
Despite this Index suffers from several potential drawbacks (see Leromain and Orefice 2013, and De 
Benedictis and Tamberi 2004 for a discussion), it gives a rough approximation of international 
                                                     
4
 The evolution of Indian exports has not followed a “textbook” pattern. The pattern of evolution points to a dichotomy 
in the Indian economy – a well integrated, technologically advanced services sector, exporting high technology and 
high-value added services, and a relatively lagging manufacturing sector, exporting relatively low-tech and low-
value products (see Anand et al. 2015). 
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specialisation in industry/product categories by measuring the industry’s share in the country’s exports 
relative to its share in world trade. Formally the RCA index reduces to: 
where n and w are the country and world indexes, respectively; while g and G are the commodity and 
the whole set of commodities indexes, respectively. The RCA index has a very simple and intuitive 
interpretation: 
- The RCA index lower than 1 suggests that the country is not specialized in exporting the 
product i.e. the share of that product in the country’s exports is less than the corresponding 
world share 
- On the contrary, The RCA index which exceeds 1 implies that the country is specialized in 
exporting the product. 
Table 4 reports the rank of HS-2 sectors based on the RCA index for the year 2005. The index of RCA 
is greater than one for 44 sectors out of 96 HS-2 industries where India has recorded exports, 
suggesting that India holds comparative advantage in these sectors in the world market. As expected, 
India holds comparative advantage in labour intensive manufacturing sectors – especially textiles – 
since wages are relatively low in comparison with the main OECD exporters. However, other than 
cotton, no other sector that ranks among the top ten according to the value of the RCA is able to retain 
the same ranking of comparative advantage at the constituent six-digit commodity level. The lower 
part of Table 4 shows that the commodities with RCA>1 are dispersed among various sectors: the 
maximum numbers of commodities with comparative advantage in the world market are concentrated 
in sectors like Organic Chemicals and Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc., which include 156 
and 91 HS-6 commodities with RCA>1, respectively. There are also some sectors where India is 
comparatively disadvantageously positioned at the aggregate level but reveal significant comparative 
advantage at the constituent commodity (HS-six digit) level. This indicates that the pattern of 
comparative advantage varies at different levels of disaggregation. These findings are in line with the 
recent strand of trade literature which sees international specialization – and therefore comparative 
advantage in the spirit of the Ricardian model of trade – occurring mostly within products across 
varieties, rather than across products or industries.
5 Indeed, considering differentiated varieties of 
commodities rather than sectors sheds new light on the perceived similarity in specialization across 
countries, especially between high income countries and emerging economies like India. As pointed 
out by Fontagné et al. (2008), we face a situation where countries are completely specialized within 
products, on varieties with different market positioning along the quality ladder. In particular, the 
literature has showed a positive relationship between the quality of exported varieties and the level of 
development of the exporter. This stylized fact – first identified by Schott (2004) and Fontagné et al. 
(2008) – supports the theoretical framework proposed by Falvey and Kierzkowski (1987) where 
advantage and North/South specialization on the supply side are based on a combination of differences 
in factor endowments and technological advance. Since products of different quality have different 
factor intensities, North countries well-endowed with skilled labour and capital will specialise in the 
more skill-intensive parts of the quality spectrum. On the contrary, South countries like India – 
                                                     
5
 Given the arbitrariness in the definition of variety, as in Fontagné et al. (2008) we rely on the distinction proposed by 
Schott (2004) between product and variety of a product. “Two different headings of the most detailed level of the 
international trade classification represent two different products (HS6). Two different market segments represent 
two different varieties of a product having different unit values. This departs from the vocabulary of the literature 
on intra-industry trade, which would use varieties to refer to products shipped under the same heading but having 
similar unit values (horizontal differentiation), as opposed to qualities having different unit values (vertical 
differentiation)”. 
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characterized by lower levels of human capital and technology – will have a comparative advantage in 
the production of low-quality commodities. The next section further explores these conjectures.  
Table 3. Indian Exports by HS-2 Digit Sectors 
Rank HS-2 Digit Sector HS-2 Digit % Total 
Exports 
HS Group 
Year 2005     
1 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 71 9.6 stone/glass 
2 Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. 27 7.9 mineral products 
3 Ores, slag and ash 26 6.4 mineral products 
4 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet 
62 6.3 textiles 
5 Iron and steel 72 5.7 metals 
6 Organic chemicals 29 5.2 chemicals 
7 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc. 84 4.5 machinery/electrical 
8 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 61 4.2 textiles 
9 Vehicles other than railway, tramway 87 3.5 transportation 
10 
Electrical Machinery, Parts, Sound & 
Television Recorders 
85 3.2 machinery/electrical 
Year 2000     
1 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet 
62 9.6 textiles 
2 Cotton, Inc. Yarns and Woven Fabrics Thereof 52 6.5 textiles 
3 Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 71 5.9 stone/glass 
4 Organic chemicals 29 5.1 chemicals 
5 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 61 4.9 textiles 
6 Iron and steel 72 4.5 metals 
7 Fish & Crustaceans 3 3.8 animal/animal prod. 
8 Mineral Fuels, Oils, Waxes, Bituminous Sub 27 3.6 mineral products 
9 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc. 84 3.5 machinery/electrical 
10 
Electrical Machinery, Parts, Sound & 
Television Recorders 
85 2.7 machinery/electrical 
Year 1995     
1 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or 
crochet 
62 11.0 textiles 
2 Cotton, Inc. Yarns and Woven Fabrics Thereof 52 7.1 textiles 
3 Organic chemicals 29 4.3 chemicals 
4 Fish & Crustaceans 3 4.2 animal/animal prod. 
5 Iron and steel 72 4.2 metals 
6 Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 61 4.0 textiles 
7 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc. 84 3.8 machinery/electrical 
8 Cereals 10 3.7 vegetable products 
9 Articles of Leather, Saddlery, Harness etc. 42 3.6 
raw 
hides/skins/leather 
10 Coffee Tea, Mate and Spices 9 3.4 vegetable products 
Source: Authors’own calculations using BACI/CEPII dataset. 
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Table 4. RCA Index by HS-6 Sectors VS  
Sector-Wise distribution of HS-6 Digit products with RCA≥1 
Ranking of RCA Index by HS-6 Sectors (2005) 
 
Description HS-2 Code HS Group Rank 
Made-up Textile Articles Nesoi, Needlecraft Sets 
etc. 
63 textiles 1 
Carpets and Other Textile Floor Coverings 57 textiles 2 
Lac, Gums, Resins etc. 13 vegetable products 3 
Ores Slag and Ash 26 mineral products 4 
Cotton, Inc. Yarns and Woven Fabrics Thereof 52 textiles 5 
Coffee, Tea, Mate and Spices 9 vegetable products 6 
Pearls, precious stones, metals, coins, etc. 71 stone/glass 7 
Veg. Textile Fibers Nesoi, Yarns/Woven etc. 53 textiles 8 
Cereals 10 vegetable products 9 
Articles of Leather, Saddlery, Harness etc. 42 raw hides/skins/leather 10 
Distribution of HS-6 Digit products with RCA≥1 (2005) 
Description HS-2 Code HS Group No. of HS-6 
with RCA≥1 
Rank 
Organic chemicals 29 chemicals 156 1 
Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery, etc. 84 machinery/electrical 91 2 
Articles of apparel, accessories, not knit or crochet 62 textiles 70 3 
Articles of apparel, accessories, knit or crochet 61 textiles 69 4 
Iron and steel 72 metals 69 5 
Inorganic Chem., Compounds of Precious Metals 
etc. 
28 chemicals 64 6 
Articles of Iron or Steel 73 metals 63 7 
Cotton, Inc. Yarns and Woven Fabrics thereof 52 textiles 58 8 
Electrical Machinery, Parts,  
Sound & Television Recorders 
85 machinery/electrical 58 9 
Man-Made Stapale Fibers, Inc. Yarns etc. 55 textiles 50 10 
Source: Authors’own calculations using BACI/CEPII dataset. 
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3.2 Market Positioning of India’s Exported Varieties and Specialization along the Quality Ladder 
One of the main perceived threats of globalization is the supposed increasing range of sectors facing 
direct competition from emerging economies. Indeed, by analyzing exports at the most detailed level 
of product classification (HS-6), India – along with other developing countries – seem to be in direct 
competition with the main OECD exporters on a wide spectrum of commodities. Almost the whole 
range of HS-6 digit product classification are covered by Indian exports. Out of 4996 products traded 
internationally in 2005, 4787 were exported by India, compared with 4902 for China and 4913 for 
United States.
6 However, as first noted by Schott (2004), although India may actually export as many 
products as United States, varieties exported by United States and India appear too different to be in 
direct competition. Table 5 reports the similarity indexes computed by Fontagné et al. (2008) for the 
year 2004 (i) at sectoral level (HS-2), (ii) at the most detailed level of commodity classification (HS-
6), and ultimately (iii) considering varieties of products. By looking at the similarity indexes calculated 
at sectoral level (HS2) there seems to be strong competition between India and the other reported 
countries, regardless their level of income. Indeed, the similarity between India and China is 
comparable to the similarity between India and US or Germany. However, by repeating the same 
analysis at a more disaggregated level, the same indexes drop considerably: at the variety level the 
magnitude of all similarity indexes are less than half of the correspondent HS-2 coefficients, suggesting 
that India and China are hardly competing with advanced economies on the same varieties because of 
an evident specialization within products and across varieties. This specialization at the most detailed 
level occurs on different position along the quality ladder for North and South: the South specializes in 
the low quality segment whereas the North has comparative advantages mainly in up-market varieties. 
Table 5. Similarity of export structures at various levels of detail of the classification (2004)
a
 
  China Germany Japan India USA 
Sector Level 
(ISIC Headings) 
Germany 0.47 -    
Japan 0.56 0.82 -   
India 0.56 0.47 0.38 -  
USA 0.55 0.81 0.77 0.48 - 
Product Level 
(HS 6 Headings) 
Germany 0.30 -    
Japan 0.34 0.56 -   
India 0.30 0.27 0.23 -  
USA 0.34 0.59 0.53 0.27 - 
Variety Level 
(Market Segment) 
Germany 0.17 -    
Japan 0.18 0.43 -   
India 0.23 0.20 0.16 -  
USA 0.24 0.46 0.40 0.21 - 
a Similarity Index is a measure of the extent to which two countries export the same products. Similarity between country A 
(column) and B (row) is one minus half the sum of the absolute value of differences between the (e.g.) sectoral shares in 
manufacturing exports of country A and those of country B. It ranges between 0 (perfect dissimilarity) and 1 (perfect 
similarity). The table reports the indexes using a different degrees of products classification: from the more aggregated 
classification Sector level, to the more disaggregated Variety level. 
Source: Fontagné et al. (2008) (Table 1) based on BACI-CEPII data. 
 
 
                                                     
6
 Authors own calculations. Data are from BACI/CEPII dataset classified as HS92-6 digit products. 
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Table 6. World Market Shares by transformation level and market segment  
(intra-EU exports excluded, 2004%) 
Market 
Segment 
Exporter Intermediate goods Consumer goods Investment goods All 
Lower EU-25 14.7 13.6 18.4 15.3 
 USA 14.4 7.4 11.5 11.9 
 Japan 8.1 4.6 9.4 7.5 
 China 14.9 25.0 25.7 20.1 
 India 2.7 3.0 0.3 2.2 
 All 100 100 100 100 
Upper EU-25 28.7 38.8 26.1 30.6 
 USA 14.6 9.9 18.5 14.4 
 Japan 15.8 9.9 16.8 14.6 
 China 2.6 5.8 5.6 4.1 
 India 0.8 1.1 0.6 0.8 
 All 100 100 100 100 
Source: Fontagné et al. (2008) (Table 3) based on BACI-CEPII data. 
The market positioning of exporters and the market shares by market segment confirm the 
specialization of India in the low-quality varieties. By splitting the world distribution of export unit 
values (EUV) into three equal market segments (low, medium, high), Fontagné et al. (2008) computes 
the world market shares by transformation level and market segment for a few selected countries 
including India. What emerges from Table 6 (above) is a larger share of Indian Exports in the lower 
quality segment:
7 more generally, the statistics show a positive correlation between country’s level of 
development and the quality segment in which the country is specialized. Indeed, as opposed to India 
and China which show a similar pattern in terms of world market shares by quality segment, the shares 
of USA, Japan and EU suggest a specialization on high quality varieties. 
Other than Ricardian supply-side factors determining country’s specialization – such as differences 
in technology (i.e. productivity) and factor endowments – there are also demand-side explanations of 
the regularities observed in India’s foreign trade. More specifically, Fontagné et al. (2008) show that 
developing countries like India spend smaller shares of their income on the low market segment and 
import products of lower quality. Table 7 reports the share of up-market products in manufactured 
exports by destination market. On the demand side, the data suggests a clear difference in the market 
positioning of the various exporters on their different destination markets, suggesting that importers at 
different levels of development do consume a different bundle of varieties. In 2004, 72.9% of 
European exports to Japan were up-market varieties, compared with 49.1 to India. 
It turns out that showing the dynamics of North/South competition in terms of different 
specialization of countries within products and across varieties rather than sectors is instrumental for 
addressing our research question: indeed, India’s advantage in exporting low-market products – along 
with the larger share of Indian imports on the same quality segment – are the crucial stylized facts for 
interpreting the role of Indian migrants on bilateral trade. Our contention is that the magnitude of pro-
trade effect of Indian emigrants will be dependent on the supply and demand characteristics of their 
country of origin. 
                                                     
7
 With the exception of Investment goods which show a larger share in the upper market segment. 
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Table 7. Share of up-market products in manufactured exports, by destination market (2004,%)
a
  
Importer  EU-25 Brazil Japan China India Total 
 
Exporter       
EU-25 41.3 34.0 72.9 46.5 49.1 43.2 
Brazil 22.8 - 37.8 9.1 14.2 15.9 
Japan 54.5 33.4 - 42.1 48.6 43.0 
China 16.6 24.4 20.7 - 20.9 11.6 
India 22.0 17.6 19.3 15.6 - 17.8 
Total 40.5 30.0 43.9 34.4 36.2 35.1 
a The sample covers manufacturing HS-6 goods including the food industry. 
Source: Fontagné et al. (2008) (Table 12) based on BACI-CEPII data. 
4. Literature Review 
There is a large literature on the pro-trade effect of migrants (see for a survey Genc et al. 2012 and 
Parsons and Winters 2014). This literature focuses on the direct ethnic links between source and host 
countries: since the seminal contribution of Gould (1994), several papers using different samples, time 
coverage and econometric techniques have investigated the relationships between bilateral trade and 
migration flows to find a strong and significant empirical correlation between the stock of immigrants 
in the destination country and the volume of trade with their country of origin (see Parsons and 
Winters (2014) for a detailed discussion). As mentioned above the underlying idea is that migrants 
have a comparative advantage in conveying reliable information on markets which are very different 
from the host country. These could be the origin countries but also countries which are similar to the 
origin in terms of religion, culture, structure of the society. The majority of the contributions study the 
pro-trade effect of immigrants into a single country, while relatively few papers focus on a multicountry 
analysis. With the recent availability of more and better data on migrant stocks, some studies also 
exploit the regional distribution of immigrants and look at the bilateral trade relationship between 
regions (or provinces) and foreign countries.
8
 
Three main stylized facts emerge from the literature: (1) the trade-migration link appears stronger 
for differentiated goods than for homogeneous commodities (2) the effect of immigrants on imports is 
typically estimated to be larger than the one on exports and (3) there is ample evidence of a stronger 
pro-trade effect for high skilled migrants. 
1. The first stylized fact implies greater importance of ethnic networks in reducing information 
costs for more differentiated goods. This rather intuitive statement has been tested empirically 
mostly by dividing the spectrum of traded goods into three broad subclasses that differ with respect 
                                                     
8
 Genc et al. (2012) analyze the distribution of immigration elasticities of imports and exports across 48 studies that 
yielded 300 observations: they report the meta-modal elasticities of immigrants which are, respectively, 0.12 for 
exports and 0.15 for imports. Among the main contributions on a single country analysis of the pro-trade effect of 
immigrants we cite Dunlevy and Hutchinson (1999) for US, Head and Ries (1998) for Canada, Tai (2009) for 
Switzerland and Girma and Yu (2002) for UK. The most important articles on a multicountry analysis are 
Felbermayr and Jung (2009), Aleksynska and Peri (2014), Ehrhart et al. (2014), Egger, Ehrlich, and Nelson 
(2012) and Felbermayr and Toubal (2012). Lastly, the most influential papers that study the bilateral trade 
relationship between regions (or provinces) and foreign countries are: Herander and Saavedra (2005) for US; 
Wagner, Head, and Ries (2002) for Canada; Bratti et al. (2014) for Italy; Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) for 
Spain; Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) and Briant, Combes, and Lafourcade (2014) for France. 
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to the degree of differentiation according to the classification proposed by Rauch (1999).
9 By 
running a gravity model separately for each aggregated group, Rauch and Trindade (2002) estimate 
separate elasticities of trade with respect to immigrant stocks for differentiated goods, goods traded 
on organized exchanges, and goods that display some reference price. Following Rauch (1999) and 
Rauch and Trindade (2002) products that possess references prices are deemed sufficiently 
homogeneous so that the price differential between two countries’ markets convey enough 
information – given customs and transport costs – on the profitability of shipping the product as 
opposed to buying the same commodity locally. On the contrary, commodities that do not possess 
reference prices are considered to be sufficiently differentiated so that prices cannot provide all the 
required information relevant for international trade: therefore for those commodities the role of 
transnational networks in overcoming informal barriers and attenuating frictions due to asymmetric 
information is likely to be much more prominent. Rauch and Trindade’ (2002) statistics show that 
the pro-trade effect of ethnic networks on differentiated products is at least 24% larger in 
magnitude compared to the correspondent impact on goods that exhibit some reference price and 
60% greater with respect to goods traded on organize exchanges.
10 The same classification and a 
similar methodology have been used – among others – by Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) and 
Ehrhart et al. (2014). 
2. As for the second stylized fact, the explanation of the gap between the immigrants elasticity of 
imports and exports is rooted in the preference channel of migration. Bratti, De Benedictis, and 
Santoni (2014) summarize the results of a sample of some of the most influential contributions to 
the trade-migration literature and find a significant difference in magnitude. Furthermore, the 
meta-analysis proposed by Genc et al. (2012) – which is based on 48 studies and it contains about 
300 estimates – indicates a discrepancy in the meta-modal elasticity between imports and exports of 
approximately 0.03. Given the lack of theoretical models which enable to separately identify the two 
channels, the gap in favor of the pro-import elasticity has commonly been the workaround strategy 
to determine the presence of the preference channel of migration.
11 As Bratti et al. (2014) argue, 
this gap is commonly attributed ‘by deductive reasoning’ to a persistent difference in tastes between 
immigrants and natives. 
3. Lastly, the third stylized fact indicates that the better the ability of the ethnic networks to receive 
and process information on trading opportunities, the higher the pro-trade effect. By focusing on a 
balanced panel of low-income Southern sending countries and high-income Northern receiving 
countries, Felbermayr and Jung (2009) find that the pro-trade elasticity of high-skilled workers is 
almost four times bigger than that of low-skilled workers when migration of all skill groups is 
accounted for. Other studies such as Ehrhart et al. (2014), Herander and Saavedra (2005) and 
Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) show higher pro-trade effects of high-skilled ethnic networks 
compared to the correspondent impact of the total stock of immigrants. 
                                                     
9
 Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) and Aleksynska and Peri (2014) use Broda and Weinstein (2006) classification to 
characterize the degree of differentiability of traded products according to their elasticity of substitution across 
varieties. Although Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010) and Aleksynska and Peri (2014) use a different classification 
of goods to characterize the degree of differentiability of products, they follow the same procedure of grouping 
these products into three broad categories: highly differentiated, moderately differentiated and less differentiated. 
10
 This result refers to the effect of the variable “CHINSHARE” in Rauch and Trindade (2002) – which proxies for the 
size of Chinese ethnic networks – on goods with reference price, goods traded in organized exchanges and 
differentiated products according to Rauch (1999) conservative classification estimated for the years 1980 and 
1990. Similar results emerge for using the liberal classification. 
11
 As Felbermayr, Grossmann, and Kohler (2012) point out, a few papers – such as Felbermayr and Toubal (2012) – 
attempt to disentangle the transaction cost from the preference channel of migration. However, so far, according to 
Felbermayr et al. (2012) no conclusive answer to this identification problem is provided and therefore they suggest 
to leave this important question open. 
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Against this background, indirect links of ethnic minorities may play an even bigger role in promoting 
bilateral trade. Not only because the larger size – the bilateral stock of migrants between source and 
host countries which is normally related to bilateral trade is often far smaller than local Indian and 
Chinese communities – but also because their qualitative effect on bilateral trade: as argued by Curtin 
(1984) trade diasporas – defined as “the interrelated net of commercial communities forming a trade 
network” dominated cross-cultural trade in most parts of the world until the nineteenth century. 
However, the literature on the indirect pro-trade effect of ethnic networks is much more limited. 
Rauch and Trindade (2002) has been the first contribution that focus on the pro-trade effects of 
indirect links. They examine the trade-creating effects of one of the largest transnational network in 
the world: the overseas Chinese. Rauch and Trindade (2002) inserted the indirect links of Chinese 
descent into a “naive” gravity equation: they have data on ethnic Chinese population shares for a 
reasonably large sample of countries in 1980 and 1990, and estimate cross-section gravity models for 
the log of bilateral trade (sum of exports and imports) for each year separately.
12 They find that the 
network formed by the overseas Chinese population (of Chinese descent) has an important trade 
creating effect: this applies not only with mainland China but, most importantly, also between country-
pairs which don’t have China as trading partner but do host these Chinese ethnic minorities. They find 
a trade creating effect of Chinese ethnic networks which is relatively large if compared with other 
trade determinants.
13 Felbermayr et al. (2010) revisit the Rauch and Trindade (2002) intuition and 
argue that shared ethnic ties increase trade as a result of common tastes rather than reducing 
transaction costs; in addition they find that Rauch and Trindade (2002) results suffer from missing 
variable bias: they estimate a smaller 15 percent increase in trade from shared ethnic networks. Using 
an alternative econometric technique (namely PPML) Felbermayr et al. (2010) extended the cross-
section analysis of Rauch and Trindade (2002) to 63 ethnic networks other than the Chinese for the 
year 2000 using aggregate trade. In order to examine the pro-trade role of other networks they use data 
from World Bank which refer to the bilateral stock of migrants, rather than the population of ethnic 
descent as in Rauch and Trindade (2002). Mexico, India, China, Turkey and Morocco figure as the top 
sending countries worldwide. They find that the trade creating potential of the Chinese network is 
dwarfed by other ethnic networks, e.g., the Polish, the Turkish, the Mexican, or the Pakistani 
networks; in their analysis the second largest sending country, India, is associated with a weak 
network, whose effect is indistinguishable from zero.
14
  
5. Data, Methodology & Econometric Specification 
5.1 Data 
Trade data: Trade data are from BACI database of CEPII. This database is particularly suitable for a 
quality analysis since it provides information about the value of trade – in thousands of US dollars and 
the quantity – in tons – for products classified at 6-digit level using Harmonized System (HS) for the 
period 1995-2005 (year by year).
15 It allows to calculate unit values which is the core of our quality 
classification in line with Fontagné et al. (2008), Hallak (2006), Schott (2004) and others. 
                                                     
12
 The sample consists of 59 countries for 1980 and 59 for 1990. 
13
 They estimate a trade-creating effect for relatively large Chinese ethnic networks on differentiated products nearly of 
60%. 
14
 Using a larger sample with the same Migration and Trade datasets in Appendix we estimate a very similar model for 
Indirect Links for Indian Ethnic Networks by pooling 4 years in a OLS model with country*year FE and we obtain 
a positive and significant effect. 
15
 We use the HS 1992 version; other versions – namely 1996 and 2002 – are available. 
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Migration data: Data on Indian Emigrants are from the recent IAB brain drain database by Brucker 
et al. (2013). Brucker et al. (2013) provide a comprehensive database on bilateral migrants resident 
in a selected group of 19 OECD economies and born in almost 200 different countries of origin for 
the period 1980-2010 (five years in five years). Rather than including all persons with any Indian 
ancestry as in Rauch and Trindade (2002), we use the total number of Indians-born aged 25 years and 
older: in any case, the focus of the migrant network is on people who have moved during their 
lifetime. Given the structure of IAB brain drain database we consider a reduced OECD sample since – 
in order to create the proxy for the size of Indian ethnic networks in line with Rauch and Trindade 
(2002) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) – both the number of Indians resident in importer and exporter 
countries are needed.
16 Despite the relatively limited country coverage we prefer the IAB brain drain 
dataset over the World Bank since it divides migrants by skill level: this suites very well to the 
purpose of this paper. Indeed, in our analysis we divide Indian emigrants in high-skilled, low 
skilled and total number of migrants. Brucker et al. (2013) label as high skilled those immigrants 
with tertiary education (higher than high-school leaving certificate or equivalent); low skilled are the 
ones who attain lower secondary, primary or no schooling. As it emerges from Table 2 the largest 
Indian communities as a share of hosting country’s total population are Canada, Great Britain, New 
Zealand and UK. 
Gravity Variables: All the proxies for trade costs along with the data on country’s GDP and 
population are from CEPII. Geographic distance proxies both for transport costs and for the lack of 
information on products. CEPII includes Weighted Distance which calculates the distance between two 
countries based on bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two countries. Those inter-city 
distances are weighted by the share of the city in the overall country’s population. More formally, 
Weighted Distance between n and i reduces to: 
Dist𝑛𝑖 =  (∑ 𝑘𝜖𝑛
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑘
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑛
) (∑ 𝑙𝜖𝑖
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑙
𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑖
) dist𝑘𝑙 
where popk stands for the population of agglomeration k belonging to country n while popl is the 
population of agglomeration l belonging to country i (see Head and Mayer 2010). The set of gravity 
variables we use also include a dummy for common language, common border and the joint belonging 
to a regional trade agreement. The CEPII gravity database has yearly data until 2006. By merging 
trade data with data on migration and gravity variables we end up with a pooled cross section structure 
with 3 years: 1995, 2000 and 2005. 
Replication of Rauch and Trindade (2002): We also perform the replication of the results of Rauch 
and Trindade (2002) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) for the correspondent indirect pro-trade effect of 
Indian Networks by using data from different sources: migration data are from World Bank, Trade 
Data are from Feenstra and the gravity dataset are again from CEPII. More details on the methodology 
and the data employed for the replication are outlined in Appendix. This exercise allows us to compare 
our results with those agreed upon in the recent literature. 
5.2 Methodology & Econometric Specification 
In what follows we classify traded goods according to their quality level k and we separately estimate 
pro-trade elasticity of ethnic networks for all subgroups. We utilize one of the two classifications of 
quality based on the differences of traded goods in terms of unit values proposed by Fontagné et al. 
(2008). As in Hallak (2006) we assume that all cross-country variation in unit values can be 
attributed to differences in quality. Since unit value is the ratio between the value and the quantity of 
exports, observations with zero trade flows and zero or no quantities are automatically dropped. 
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 We don’t include Luxembourg as destination country. 
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Despite this loss of information, we’re able to estimate consistently the pro-trade effect of immigrants 
using a very large number of observations. Furthermore, the lack of zero trade flows in our dependent 
variable allows to avoid the issue of treatment of zeroes in gravity log-log specifications as warned by 
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Head and Mayer (2014). Following the methodology proposed 
by Fontagné et al. (2008), market segments are simply defined by percentiles in each year. We define 
the relative unit value ratio for any trade flow s: r = (UVs/UVworld ), where the reference group is the 
trade weighted (geometric) average of UV over all flows in the world of a given HS-6digit category. 
We use data at 6-digit level which encompass different traded commodities under the same HS6 
category, reported by firms in a given country at time t. Given the possibility of some selection bias 
due to the relatively small size of the samples – i.e. some country pairs may appear solely in some 
specific deciles and not in others – we first divide the spectrum of traded goods based on relative unit 
values into quartiles (K = 4): the down market segment lies under the 25th percentile, whereas the up-
market segment above the 75th percentile, in between the other two intermediate classes. The 
samples are therefore divided into classes of approximately equal size of around 1/4 of the total 
observations. 
The empirical strategy is very similar to Fontagné et al. (2008) who estimate a single gravity equation 
where the proxies for trade costs are interacted with binary variables which indicate the quality level g. 
They consider three quality segments k while they estimate only the effects for the up-market and 
down-market. We depart from their approach, in that we set K = 4 and we interact gravity variables with 
each quality segment. 
We estimate the following specification: 
where: 
– Xni,k,g: is imports from i to n of quality k and sector g. 
– GDPi * GDPn: is the product of importer’s n and exporter’s i GDP. 
– St: stand for year Fixed Effects. 
– Si: stand for Exporter Fixed Effects. 
– Sn: stand for Importer Fixed Effects. 
– Sg: stand for HS-6digit sector Fixed Effects. 
– Sk: stand for Quality Fixed Effects. k goes from 1 to 4 according to the Quality segment considered. 
– RTAni: is a dummy which equals 1 if trading partners both belong to a RTA, 0 otherwise. 
– Distni: is the weighted distance between i and n. 
– Langni: is a dummy which equals 1 if importer and exporter speak the same language, 0 otherwise. 
– Contigni: is a dummy which equals 1 if trading partners share a border, 0 otherwise. 
– IndShareni: equals the product of the ethnic Indian population shares for countries i and n. 
– δni,k: stand for the error term. 
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Unlike Rauch and Trindade (2002) who use the log of the sum of imports and exports as dependent 
variable, we select imports from i to n in line with the EK empirical analysis. All independent 
variables are in logarithm including IndShareni since we prefer an elasticity interpretation also for the 
size of Indian Networks.
17 As in Rauch and Trindade (2002) the strength of ethnic Indian networks is 
measured by the probability that, if we select an individual at random from each country, both will be 
ethnic Indian. Equation 1 is estimated with OLS using a set of high dimensional HS-6digit sector fixed 
effects. The structure of the model and the econometric technique are identical to Fontagné et al. 
(2008). However, unlike Fontagné et al. (2008) – who use the ISIC classification, in which there are 
25 manufacturing sectors which are introduced as fixed effects – we are able to include a very large 
number of Fixed Effects, one for each HS-6 digit category.
18 Unfortunately, given memory limitation 
in our model we cannot include country*time fixed effects or performing robustness checks with 
PPML and GPML as suggested by Head and Mayer (2014) with the same set of high dimensional 
(HD) fixed effects. 
6. Results 
Before turning to quality analysis we report the estimates of the gravity equation with no interactions 
with quality segments k in Table 8. The goal is to measure the importance of the indirect pro-trade 
effect of Indian ethnic networks and compare it to (a) the correspondent effect of Chinese Networks 
which has been object of some influential studies on the trade-migration literature such as Rauch and 
Trindade (2002) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) and to (b) the direct pro-trade effect of the bilateral 
stock of migrants from OECD economies. All the gravity coefficients have the expected sign and are 
statistically significant, with the exception of GDP. A possible explanation for the insignificance of 
GDP (i.e. of the high standard error for the lnGDPi * GDPn coefficient) is the likelihood of high 
collinearity between the number of Indian immigrants and GDP of the destination countries since 
high income countries tend to be those that attract the largest flows of immigrants. We test this 
conjecture by running the same gravity model without lnIndShareni and we obtain a positive GDP 
coefficient of 0.131 (0.038) statistically significant at 1%.
19 Therefore in this case a more 
parsimonious gravity specification – as the one utilized by Eaton and Kortum (2002) and Harrigan 
(1996) – which includes only exporter and importer fixed effects as proxy for country size may be 
preferable. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 8 compare the indirect pro-trade effect of the Indian networks with 
the Chinese one: in our 19 countries OECD sample the effect of the Indian networks are almost twice 
as big. This confirms the general conclusions of Felbermayr et al. (2010), who found that the trade 
creating potential of the Chinese network is dwarfed by other ethnic networks. 
In columns (3) and (4) we run the same regressions by controlling for the direct pro-trade effect of 
the bilateral stock of migrants between the source and the host countries. More precisely, we include 
lnMigShareni as additional independent v ariable which proxies for the size of the bilateral ethnic 
networks between i and n:  
  
                                                     
17
 This is in contrast with the literature on indirect ethnic networks effect on trade, see for instance Rauch and Trindade 
(2002) and Felbermayr et al. (2010) who estimate the same impact on trade by using simply the product of the 
shares. 
18
 The estimates are obtained with the STATA command areg:depvar indepvar, absorb(hs96) cluster(countrypair). 
19
 As additonal test we use the vif command in STATA (where VIF stands for variance inflation factor) to check for 
multicollinearity. As a rule of thumb, a variable whose VIF values are greater than 10 may merit further 
investigation. Tolerance, defined as 1/VIF, is used by many researchers to check on the degree of collinearity. As a 
rule of thumb a tolerance value lower than 0.1 may merit further investigation. We obtain a 1/VIF value of 152.29. 
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where Migni stands for the stock of immigrants from country i and resident in country n. As the 
variable lnMigShareni is introduced, both the indirect network effects slightly decrease in magnitude, 
meaning that some of the Chinese and Indian network effects previously estimated in column (1) and 
(2) were capturing some of the impact of bilateral OECD ethnic networks. More importantly, both the 
Chinese and Indian Networks coefficients are larger than the Migni. We believe this result is striking: 
in the OECD context the indirect pro-trade role of the major ethnic networks dominates the 
correspondent direct effect of the bilateral stocks of migrants from OECD. 
As a robustness check the lower part of Table 8 reports the correspondent 2SLS estimates. Indeed, a 
major econometric issue likely to arise when estimating this gravity equation is an endogeneity bias 
that may be derived from measurement errors, omitted variables and/or potential reverse causality 
between trade flows and the size of Indian networks. To our knowledge this is the first contribution 
which uses an IV approach to study the indirect pro-trade effect of ethnic networks. We utilize the 
STATA command ivreg2hdfe recently written by Bahar (2014) which allows to estimate 2SLS with 2 
sets of High Dimensional fixed effects. Similarly to Briant, Combes, and Lafourcade (2014) and 
Combes, Lafourcade, and Mayer (2005) we instrument the size of ethnic networks with the 
correspondent 15-years lags.
20 As an additional instrument we utilize the past total number of 
immigrants over hosting country population for each country pair: 
We select the 15 years lags since these are the earliest stocks of bilateral immigrants available from 
Brucker et al. (2013). The 2SLS estimates essentially confirm our main findings: the effect of Indian 
ethnic networks remain larger compared to the Chinese. In line with Combes et al. (2005) endogeneity 
appears to introduce a downward bias: we find that the coefficients for migrant network variables are 
way larger, when instrumented. 
Table 9 reports the results of the OLS estimation of Equation 1.
21 The effects of the proxies for 
trade costs vary substantially according to the quality segment. As noted by Fontagné et al. (2008) 
bilateral distance may proxy for two different effects: (a) firstly, as a proxy for transport costs, 
distance increases the relative price of the lower-market segment for the consumer, making the upper 
market commodities relatively more convenient (Alchian Allen conjecture); (b) secondly, distance is a 
proxy for the lack of information on products and may therefore reduce the consumption of expensive 
varieties. Our results suggest that the information effect is likely to dominate since the parameters on 
distance interacted with the medium-high and high market segments are larger in absolute value than 
the low quality market. 
Furthermore, the upper segment of the market is more sensitive to cultural proximity proxied by the 
common language dummy Langni. On the contrary, the effect of Contigni is larger for cheap 
commodities: country-pairs that share a border tend to trade more with each other especially in 
commodities of lower quality. Lastly, country-pairs that both belong to a Regional Trade Agreement 
has much weaker effects: only for low quality segments Rtani exhibit a positive impact on trade 
statistically significant at 10%. 
                                                     
20
 We refer to the size of Indian and Chinese networks for 1980 to construct the instrumental variable for the Indian 
and Chinese shares in year 1995. 
21
 The 2SLS estimates are not reported since the number of instruments is not sufficient to match the number of 
endogenous variables in our regression. 
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The indirect pro-trade effect of Indian networks in OECD countries is positive and statistically 
significant across all quality levels. Our results suggest that ethnic Indian networks have a 
quantitatively important impact on bilateral trade. More specifically, as it emerges from the evidence, 
this effect is particularly strong for products of low and low-medium quality. Our hypothesis is that 
the magnitude of the pro-trade effect of Indian networks is associated with the comparative advantage 
of their country of origin. Given that India is specialized in the production of varieties of low-medium 
quality, Indian networks – through their role in matching trading opportunities and provision of market 
and product information – tend to mostly facilitate trade of those varieties. 
In general the pro-trade coefficients of Indian ethnic networks increases with the skill level of 
migrants. This confirms the hypothesis of the high skilled having a more prominent role in reducing 
information cost in bilateral trade given higher human capital and lower liquidity constraints. 
However, skill level doesn’t affect the trend of the pro-trade effect over quality: as for the total stock, 
the largest effects for both the low and the high-skilled are on products of low-medium quality. 
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Table 8. Ethnic Networks Indirect effect on trade – India vs Chinaabc 
Dependent Variable lnXni,g lnXni,g lnXni,g lnXni,g 
Estimator OLS (1) OLS (2) OLS (3) OLS (4) 
lnGDPi * GDPn 0.068* 0.064 0.054 0.061 
 (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.043) 
lnDistni −0.721*** −0.721*** −0.642** −0.642** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.068) 
Rtani 0.200 0.202 0.295** 0.296** 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.148) (0.148) 
Contigni 0.636*** 0.635*** 0.580*** 0.579*** 
 (0.074) (0.107) (0.104) (0.104) 
Langni 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.181** 0.182** 
 (0.071) (0.084) (0.090) (0.090) 
lnMigShareni   0.041
*** 0.041*** 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
lnIndShareni 0.119***  0.113***  
 (0.026)  (0.026)  
lnChiShareni  0.060***  0.047** 
  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Year FE X X X X 
Imp/Exp FE X X X X 
HS-6digit FE X X X X 
R
2
 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40 
RMSE 1.92 1.94 1.92 1.94 
Estimator 2SLS (5) 2SLS (6) 2SLS (7) 2SLS (8) 
lnGDPi * GDPn −0.017 −0.131* −0.029 −0.159** 
 (0.048) (0.062) (0.050) (0.064) 
lnDistni −0.720*** −0.720*** −0.642*** −0.647*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.068) (0.067) 
Rtani 0.201 0.208 0.296* 0.296* 
 (0.150) (0.149) (0.149) (0.147) 
Contigni 0.637*** 0.633*** 0.582*** 0.582** 
 (0.107) (0.107) (0.104) (0.105) 
Langni 0.277*** 0.277*** 0.183* 0.191* 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.359) (0.091) 
lnMigShareni   0.041** 0.037** 
   (0.012) (0.013) 
lnIndShareni 0.285***  0.289***  
 (0.067)  (0.068)  
lnChiShareni  0.238***  0.252*** 
  (0.046)  (0.048) 
Year FE X X X X 
Imp/Exp FE X X X X 
HS-6digit FE X X X X 
Hansen J P-val 0.607 0.780 0.599 0.442 
R
2
     
RMSE 1.94 1.94 1.94 1.94 
Obs. 1736235 1736235 1736235 1736235 
a The estimated equation for column (2) is: 
lnXni,g = θ1ln(GDPi * GDPn) + θ2lnDistni + θ3Langni + θ4Contigni + θ5RTAni + Si + Sn + Sg + θ6lnMigShareni + θ7lnIndShareni + 
θ8δni,g 
b *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
c Estimates are obtained with clustered by country-pair standard errors. The model includes the intercept. 
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Table 9. Indirect Pro-Trade Effects of Indian ethnic networks  
by skill and quality of traded products
ab
 
 
a *,**, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
b Estimates are obtained with clustered by country-pair standard errors. The model includes the intercept. The subscripts L, ML, MH and 
H stand for Low, Medium Low, Medium High and High quality segment, respectively. 
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7. Summary and Policy Implications 
International migrants trigger bilateral trade as their presence reduces information costs or boost 
additional demand for goods from their source countries. This paper contributes to the strand of 
literature on the indirect role of ethnic minorities in promoting trade, following a similar approach as 
Rauch and Trindade (2002). We focus on the pro-trade effect of Indian Networks, which has recently 
become the largest network worldwide. As opposed to Rauch and Trindade (2002) who divide traded 
commodities according to their level of product differentiation based on the classification proposed by 
Rauch (1999), we focus on quality. More precisely, we test how the indirect pro-trade effect of Indian 
Networks vary with quality of traded commodities. 
Our empirical framework follows the analysis of Fontagné et al. (2008) both for the quality 
classification of traded goods as well as for the gravity specification. Unlike Fontagné et al. (2008), 
however, we use a reduced sample of 19 OECD countries: the number of countries has been limited by 
the availability of data on ethnic minorities divided by skill level from the recent IAB brain drain 
database by Brucker et al. (2013). Four main results stand out: 
- Indian co-ethnic networks exert a pro-trade effect which is twice as big as the correspondent 
impact of Chinese minorities. This result is in line with Felbermayr et al. (2010) who find that 
the pro-trade role of Chinese Networks is substantially smaller with respect to other networks. 
- The indirect pro-trade effect of both Indian and Chinese networks dominates the 
correspondent direct effect between source and host country. This result suggests that in the 
OECD context the pro-trade role of migrants is largely determined by the major ethnic 
minorities. 
- The impact of Indian co-ethnic networks on trade is particularly strong for products of low 
and low-medium quality. Our hypothesis is that the resulting trend over quality is likely to be 
driven by specific information advantages of Indian Ethnic Networks over low-price 
commodities, which in turn depend on India’s specialization across varieties. Since India is 
specialized in the production of varieties of low-medium quality, Indian networks – through 
their role in the matching of trading opportunities and provision of market and product 
information – are more likely to facilitate trade in the low quality segment. Another plausible 
explanation may be that, regardless their skill level, Indian emigrants tend to prefer consuming 
low price varieties because of (on average) stricter budget constraints with respect to OECD 
natives. 
- The high-skill Indian networks have a much greater impact on trade and this is consistent 
across quality segments. Our results suggest that skill level doesn’t seem to play any role in 
determining the trend over quality: as for the total stock, the largest impacts of both the high-
and-low-skilled are still on medium-low quality commodities. 
In general the results highlight the importance of the trade promoting role of the networks created by 
the largest ethnic minorities in OECD countries. This argument is often overlooked or underestimated 
in the political debate on migration issues, as the potential benefits of a growing diasporas for OECD 
economies are often confined and associated only to highly qualified workforce at lower costs. From 
an OECD perspective, the results indicate the inflow of Indian and Chinese migrants as desirable at 
least for boosting bilateral trade relationships across countries. An interesting topic for further research 
would be to study whether the same networks have similar indirect effects for Foreign Direct 
Investments. 
As for India, the statistics clearly suggest that the trade enhancing role of Indian Networks can 
provide a valuable contribution to their homeland’s economic growth and development. Given the 
large trade-promoting effect in OECD economies, there’s no reason to believe that a similar impact 
can’t be found on bilateral trade relationships with India as well, considering for instance the larger 
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utility that can be derived by Indian emigrants for goods produced in their native country. Furthermore, 
one could also speculate on the likelihood that Indian migrants could substitute for the still relatively 
weak institutional framework of the country. When contract enforcement is problematic and issues of 
trust become key, skilled migrant have an even more important role to play. 
In connection to the above, Indian Foreign Trade seems to be well positioned to benefit from the 
increasing size of Indian Diaspora (especially high skilled): since India has great potential in (i) 
expanding exports to new areas, (ii) increasing the share of high-quality manufacturing exports and 
(iii) enhancing the sophistication of traded goods and services, Indian Emigrants may play an important 
and decisive role in promoting and facilitating international transactions of those goods and services in 
the new export destinations. 
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Appendix. Replication of Rauch and Trindade (2002) results for Indian Ethnic Networks 
The seminal contribution of Rauch and Trindade (2002) was the first empirical paper that studies the 
indirect links between agents of the same ethnicity in different host countries. They use a gravity 
framework estimated with a threshold Tobit model to show that the network formed by the overseas 
Chinese population CHINSHARE has a major trade creating effect not only with mainland China but 
also between countries that host these Chinese ethnic minorities. Quantitatively, they find that the pro-
trade effect of Chinese co-ethnic networks is large compared to other determinants of bilateral trade. 
In particular, Rauch and Trindade (2002) estimate a larger effects for ethnic Chinese networks on 
bilateral trade in differentiated commodities compared to products that exhibit “reference prices” or 
that are traded in organized exchanges. In the following econometric exercise we replicate the Rauch 
and Trindade (2002) result for Indian Ethnic Networks. Similarly as in Rauch and Trindade (2002) we 
focus on the effect of IndShare, which is the product of the ethnic Indian population shares for 
importers and exporters. However, instead of 63 countries we extend the sample to 154 destination& 
origin countries. As Felbermayr et al. (2010) we use trade data from NBER-UN World Trade Data, a 
comprehensive dataset which covers world bilateral trade for the period 1962-2000. Trade data are 
available at industry level according to SITC-4 digit classification: we aggregate trade data for each 
country-pair. Unlike Rauch and Trindade (2002) who as emigrants consider all persons with any 
Chinese ancestry, our only available source for migrants with such an extensive country coverage is 
the World Bank dataset of Özden et al. (2011) which comprises only the stocks of bilateral migrants 
i.e. Indians born in India and resident in a foreign country for the years 1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. 
Table 10 illustrates the Indian Diaspora over the years since 1970: the total number of Indians 
resident in foreign countries increased drastically from 1990 to 2000. The countries in bold are the top 
9 destinations for Indian emigrants in 2000: some of them – Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bangladesh and 
Pakistan – are neighboring countries; the others – Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Saudi 
Arabia and United Arab Emirates – are OECD and Gulf economies which are common destinations 
for all emigrants regardless the ethnic origins. We merge the Özden et al. (2011) migration dataset 
with NBER-UN World Trade Data and we combine it with the gravity proxies for trade costs from 
CEPII in order to obtain a pooled structure with 4 years and 154 importers and exporters. The gravity 
equation we estimate is: 
lnXni = St + θlnRemote + θlndistni + θlnGDPni + θlangni + θcontigni + θRTAni + θIndShare + θδni (2) 
where: 
– Xni: is imports from i to n. 
– GDPni: is the product of importer’s n and exporter’s i GDP at time t from CEPII. 
– RTAni: is a dummy from CEPII which equals 1 if trading partners both belong to a RTA at time t, 0 
otherwise. 
– distni: is the weighted distance between i and n at time t from CEPII. 
– langni: is a dummy from CEPII which equals 1 if importer and exporter speak the same language at 
time t, 0 otherwise. 
– contigni: is a dummy from CEPII which equals 1 if trading partners share a border, 0 otherwise. 
– St: stand for year Fixed Effects. 
– δni: stand for the error term. 
– Remoteni: equals the product of the weighted sum of country i’s distances from all other countries in 
the sample and the same weighted sum for country n, where the weights are the GDPs of the other 
countries. 
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– IndShare: equals the product of the ethnic Indian population shares for countries i and n. 
Contrary to the original cross section structure of the gravity equation of Rauch and Trindade (2002), our 
version includes 4 different years and therefore we include year Fixed Effects as in Girma and Yu 
(2002). Given the presence of only 4 zero trade flows out of more than 35 thousand observations, we 
deem a standard OLS model as preferable compared to the threshold Tobit model of Eaton and Tamura 
(1994) utilised in Rauch and Trindade (2002). In addition, Head and Mayer (2014) discourage the use of 
the threshold Tobit model because of two drawbacks: (a) the threshold parameter lacks a compelling 
structural interpretation and (b) it is not a “canned” program. We compare our “naive” version of Rauch 
and Trindade (2002) gravity specification with a standard OLS fixed effects model, as firstly introduced 
by Harrigan (1996).
22
 In order to capture country-year heterogeneity we augment the gravity model by 
including country*year fixed effects. Our model specification and the data sources are very similar to 
Felbermayr et al. (2010), who revisited Rauch and Trindade (2002)’s findings and discover other ethnic 
communities which act as global trade facilitators. They find that the trade creating potential of the 
Chinese network is dwarfed by other ethnic networks, e.g., the Polish, the Turkish, the Mexican, or the 
Pakistani network. As for the Indian Networks, Felbermayr et al. (2010) find that India – their second 
largest sending country of the numerous networks analysed in their paper – “is associated with a weak 
network, whose effect is indistinguishable from zero”. However, one limitation of their empirical 
exercise is the cross section structure of their model: due to the impossibility of merging data for many 
years they estimate a cross section model for the year 2000.
23
  
The results are reported in Table 11. As in Rauch and Trindade (2002) we include a dummy DUM 
which equals 1 when the populations of both trading partners are at least 1% Ethnic Indians, 0 
otherwise. The results indicate that Indian Ethnic Networks exert a positive effect on trade: the 
coefficient IndShare is way larger than the correspondent effect of the Chinese networks 
“CHINSHARE” from Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Felbermayr et al. (2010). The trade creating 
potential of the Indian Networks decreases in terms of magnitude when we remove the remoteness 
variable and we include importer*year and exporter*year fixed effects. 
  
                                                     
22
 Since most of the size effect of GDP is mostly captured by country*time year fixed effects, GDP is omitted from the 
regression. This structure is very similar to Harrigan (1996) and Eaton and Kortum (2002). 
23
 Given the high number of Fixed Effects in our model PPML led to non-convergence and therefore we cannot 
compare OLS with PPML and GPML as suggested by Head and Mayer (2014) as robustness check. 
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Table 10. The size of Indians’ Diaspora by Destination Country 
Destination 
Country 
year 1970 year 1980 year 1990 year 2000 Destination  
Country 
year 1970 year 1980 year 1990 year 2000 
Afghanistan 26242 5639 3352 6904 Ecuador 6 9 9 79 
Albania 2 3 3 3 Egypt, Arab Rep. 519 689 45 826 
Algeria 4 3 3 2 El Salvador 5 17 25 4 
American Samoa 4 8 7 9 Equatorial Guinea 17 84 44 72 
Andorra 28 9 17 22 Eritrea 429 473 124 113 
Angola 288 115 126 198 Estonia 0 0 0 53 
Anguilla 0 0 3 6 Ethiopia 1168 1228 1291 1357 
Antigua and Barbuda 13 22 33 46 Faeroe Islands 5 6 7 14 
Argentina 306 434 220 337 
Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas) 
0 0 0 3 
Armenia 0 0 0 0 Fiji 7861 4802 3891 4531 
Aruba 25 24 111 184 Finland 93 181 522 1136 
Australia 18165 40170 59297 94110 France 8074 15718 23455 136233 
Austria 764 2815 4718 6887 French Guiana 0 0 2 3 
Azerbaijan 0 0 0 0 French Polynesia 5 9 21 27 
Bahamas, The 74 130 168 187 Gabon 112 128 181 276 
Bahrain 6668 15286 30533 39310 Gambia, The 58 431 614 887 
Bangladesh 704574 779720 854364 936151 Georgia 0 0 0 0 
Barbados 209 419 462 529 Germany 7573 29642 21616 35486 
Belarus 0 0 0 0 Ghana 1941 628 2198 3767 
Belgium 623 1598 2700 3533 Gibraltar 5 41 3 35 
Belize 97 113 0 271 Greece 92 364 4250 6934 
Benin 40 52 68 116 Greenland 6 7 7 6 
Bermuda 11 55 1 91 Grenada 4 0 9 17 
Bhutan 12370 16699 22544 30431 Guadeloupe 30 79 181 163 
Bolivia 4 6 91 116 Guam 248 12 120 156 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
13 23 110 86 Guatemala 5 9 4 16 
Botswana 9 116 1903 3867 Guinea 87 129 52 76 
Brazil 357 1014 693 759 Guinea-Bissau 4 4 8 8 
Brunei Darussalam 1071 1341 2619 3725 Guyana 303 366 95 0 
Bulgaria 111 113 112 522 Haiti 11 13 18 24 
Burkina Faso 2 3 144 56 Honduras 28 36 78 14 
Burundi 142 114 48 38 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
6439 1304 3096 58685 
Cambodia 433 6 52 319 Hungary 532 463 395 373 
Cameroon 335 267 1 1 Iceland 1 36 92 149 
Canada 45737 84397 149951 313999 India 0 0 0 0 
Cape Verde 7 8 0 0 Indonesia 48166 24793 7190 6424 
Cayman Islands 1 5 61 40 Iran, Islamic Rep. 218 826 1979 1669 
Central African 
Republic 
7 15 13 4 Iraq 865 587 484 61 
Chad 1045 1155 1276 1446 Ireland 1623 2885 3522 3355 
Chile 69 176 273 540 Israel 18458 20680 16249 15159 
China 826 127 349 5767 Italy 1206 1370 8198 43249 
Colombia 48 59 73 116 Jamaica 602 746 661 1123 
Comoros 6 23 90 88 Japan 768 1698 3220 7518 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 67967 42758 29548 24192 Jordan 61 194 593 3475 
Congo, Rep. 213 543 902 166 Kazakhstan 0 0 0 0 
Cook Islands 0 3 8 12 Kenya 14401 11500 8133 551 
Costa Rica 9 12 22 41 Kiribati 0 9 0 14 
Cote d’Ivoire 209 268 424 39 Korea, Dem. Rep. 86 34 63 512 
Croatia 0 2 30 5 Korea, Rep. 12 2 3 1443 
Cuba 927 439 190 39 Kuwait 21896 59060 106856 100904 
Cyprus 27 46 66 1249 Kyrgyz Republic 0 0 0 210 
Czech Republic 6 7 50 244 Lao PDR 33 34 36 34 
Denmark 569 1940 2841 4400 Latvia 0 0 0 55 
Djibouti 62 125 197 253 Lebanon 317 1127 20213 35326 
Dominica 4 1 10 15 Lesotho 46 36 382 132 
Dominican Republic 282 291 316 351 Liberia 518 1360 1360 1294 
Source: Özden et al.           (cont.) 
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Table 10. The size of Indians’ Diaspora by Destination Country (cont.) 
Destination 
Country 
year 1970 year 1980 year 1990 year 2000 Destination  
Country 
year 1970 year 1980 year 1990 year 2000 
Libya 57 145 213 256 Samoa 3 4 3 7 
Liechtenstein 0 0 1 9 San Marino 0 0 0 0 
Lithuania 0 0 0 19 Sao Tome and Principe 5 4 5 5 
Luxembourg 56 192 1142 390 Saudi Arabia 70109 357516 931457 1007649 
Macao SAR, China 94 342 375 406 Senegal 129 136 254 250 
Macedonia, FYR 22 39 1129 1312 Serbia     
Madagascar 10371 4059 6502 5878 Serbia and Montenegro 121 217 68 251 
Malawi 3982 129 127 125 Seychelles 343 638 587 1650 
Malaysia 150723 98724 32931 67701 Sierra Leone 317 391 385 356 
Maldives 945 212 154 275 Singapore 50875 42266 43696 105187 
Mali 55 54 53 4 Slovak Republic 3 3 9 19 
Malta 0 4 8 23 Slovenia 0 0 0 5 
Marshall Islands 5 6 7 7 Solomon Islands 2 0 58 11 
Martinique 8 21 42 50 Somalia 629 808 191 217 
Mauritania 0 2 11 12 South Africa 21765 16833 8897 17047 
Mauritius 908 1200 1240 8185 Spain 0 0 3888 7353 
Mayotte 7 15 38 76 Sri Lanka 1080645 644956 447083 384789 
Mexico 357 101 112 401 St. Kitts and Nevis 1 1 10 35 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 3 8 13 12 St. Lucia 4 1 14 72 
Moldova 0 0 0 0 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
3 3 6 10 
Monaco 21 267 333 392 Sudan 1762 2261 4465 5386 
Mongolia 19 23 28 34 Suriname 296 145 113 4 
Montserrat 0 0 20 2 Swaziland 262 37 203 273 
Morocco 5 3 2 2 Sweden 890 4438 8171 10988 
Mozambique 539 691 2353 6312 Switzerland 671 396 1462 6419 
Myanmar 100011 67188 44087 35178 Syrian Arab Republic 7714 5612 7938 10438 
Namibia 142 228 365 349 Taiwan, China 0 0 32 181 
Naura 45 72 59 26 Tajikistan 0 0 0 0 
Nepal 322152 229585 407123 563571 Tanzania 21055 3942 3796 7151 
Netherlands 1009 2783 8010 10834 Thailand 939 2557 4434 14419 
Netherlands Antilles 143 125 429 52 Timor-Leste 69 64 75 77 
New Caledonia 76 85 68 62 Togo 752 791 826 851 
New Zealand 5629 6279 7131 20667 Tokelau 1 0 0 0 
Nicaragua 8 9 10 12 Tonga 6 61 132 77 
Niger 500 675 508 163 Trinidad and Tobago 460 954 766 631 
Nigeria 1112 6258 1753 2939 Tunisia 35 15 30 28 
Niue 0 0 0 0 Turkey 579 691 1251 567 
Norfolk Island 0 0 2 2 Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 
Northern Mariana 
Islands 
2 2 145 175 
Turks and Caicos 
Islands 
0 0 6 6 
Norway 354 1874 4485 5241 Tuvalu 0 0 0 0 
Oman 31427 73080 211955 312053 Uganda 21435 10918 1192 5390 
Pakistan 4858023 3899706 3130431 2512906 Ukraine 0 0 0 13 
Palau 1 2 35 41 United Arab Emirates 21584 235611 437179 751142 
Panama 531 896 1509 2159 United Kingdom 336567 401255 429885 524796 
Papua New Guinea 377 458 355 267 United States 69997 227684 494290 1041320 
Paraguay 0 18 23 123 Uruguay 15 11 11 2 
Peru 44 54 177 145 Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 
Philippines 3647 2096 4400 12439 Vanuatu 69 38 29 8 
Poland 6 101 195 330 Venezuela 17 376 379 221 
Portugal 1558 4070 6450 6466 Vietnam 490 602 374 2319 
Puerto Rico 60 86 798 801 Virgin Islands 128 16 350 325 
Qatar 1696 16667 33750 52788 Virgin Islands, British 4 5 17 19 
Reunion 83 203 271 401 Wallis and Futuna 0 0 1 4 
Romania 1 0 0 2 West Bank and Gaza 181 214 282 436 
Russian Federation 0 0 0 26 Yemen, Rep. 6190 7664 9488 11092 
Rwanda 607 769 562 2014 Zambia 7081 6845 5320 4814 
Saint Helena 4 4 3 3 Zimbabwe 3117 2940 2773 2550 
Saint Pierre and 
Miquelon 
0 0 0 0 TOTAL 8260687 7582096 8176592 9516831 
Source: Özden et al. 
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Table 11. Replicating Rauch and Trindade (2002) results for Indian Emigrants
ab 
 
a *, **, *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
b Obs. = 35012. Estimates are obtained with clustered by country-pair standard errors. 
